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On the cultural transmission of corruption
Abstract
We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping
generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two
steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is
the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and
on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts
have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns.
Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully. Journal of Economic
Literature Classification Numbers: D10, J13.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mohammedans are Mohammedans because they are born and reared among the
sect, not because they have thought it out and can furnish sound reasons for
being Mohammedans; we know why Catholics are Catholics; why Presbyterians
are Presbyterians; why Baptists are Baptists; why Mormons are Mormons; why
thieves are thieves; why monarchists are monarchists; why Republicans are Re-
publicans and Democrats, Democrats. We know that it is a matter of association
and sympathy, not reasoning and examination; that hardly a man in the world
has an opinion on morals, politics, or religion that he got otherwise than through
his associations and sympathies. Mark Twain
In 1974 Hong Kong, a country plagued by corruption for centuries, launched
another anticorruption campaign. The success of the new Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in a country where all previous
attempts to fight corruption had failed surprised many observers. The
main diﬀerence from former reforms was that ICAC combined new incen-
tives with a change in values.1 In policy debates, Hong Kong became the
example that socialization programs promoting ethical values against cor-
ruption can work. Some empirical studies point out that the perception
of corruption as a social problem in Hong Kong depends to some extent
on age (and therefore on the time the diﬀerent groups were exposed to
the ICAC). For instance, in 1986, 75.1% of the 15-24 age group (which
had been subject to the ICAC’s education program for about 13 years)
believed that corruption was a social problem, whereas only 54% of the
45-64 age group (who were born and lived their formative years when the
ICAC didn’t exist) agreed with that. In 1977 32% believed that tipping
government employees for prompt service is an oﬀense, compared to 72%
in 1986. Similarly, in 1977 38% believed that under-the-table kickbacks
is a normal business practice, compared to 7% in 1986. In 1998 and 1999
surveys, about 85% of respondents aged between 15 and 24 said they would
not tolerate corruption in both the Government and the business sector.
1The declared goals of ICAC were: “To change people’s behavior so that they will
not engage in corrupt behavior initially for fear of detection (deterrence), later because
they cannot (prevention) and yet later because they do not wish to (attitude change).”
The main emphasis of the ICAC education program was to “build a strong altruism and
a sense of responsibility in oneself and toward the others”, de-emphasizing the impor-
tance of getting money and getting ahead at the expenses of the others (Clark [10]). Its
theme was “Money is not everything”. Anticorruption messages were included into the
curriculum in primary and secondary schools, and special teachers were trained for this
purpose. Inter-school speech contests on moral values and management game competi-
tions were organized. High school service group leaders were sent to training camps on
“Business without Corruption”. TV dramas and film strips condemning corruption were
produced. People were injected with moral values and taught not to tolerate corruption.
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In the economic literature on corruption, which is based on incentives
and optimizing behavior, values and preferences are taken as given. Thus,
the existing corruption literature cannot provide any rationale concerning
the reasons why and under which circumstances values educational pro-
grams can work. On the other hand, cultural explanations of corruption
usually ignore economic payoﬀs and are often nearly tautological. Higher
corruption levels are explained as a result of social norms more favorable
to corruption, without addressing the issue of how countries may have
such diﬀerent norms. The present paper combines the cultural with the
economic explanation, and thereby fills the gap between the two diﬀerent
types of literature on corruption. This is done by embedding a model of
corrupt behavior similar to Tirole [14] in a model of endogenous cultural
transmission of values based on Bisin and Verdier [5]. Cultural values of
corruption are transmitted via education from older agents to new agents;
but the incentives of cultural parents to shape the attitudes of new agents
towards corruption depend on economic factors and hence directly on the
expected payoﬀs from corrupt acts. In our model, agents are perfectly ra-
tional even in the cultural transmission process. Our approach thus allows
us to examine the eﬀects of the typical policy measures of the economic
literature (changes in payoﬀs, fines, the eﬀects of increased monitoring) as
well as educational anticorruption campaigns. Moreover, economic pay-
oﬀs (and therefore also technologies and institutional features related to
corruption) are shown to aﬀect the pattern of values in society.
We postulate a simple overlapping generation model with a principal-
agent relation, rational expectations and random matching. Corruption
exists because of asymmetric information and costly monitoring. As in
Tirole (1996) in each period every infinitely-lived principal has to assign
a project to the agent with whom he is randomly matched. There are
two types of projects: Project 1 is socially better than Project 2 if man-
aged with honesty. The reverse is true if the agent behaves dishonestly.
The projects can be interpreted as two diﬀerent public investments, one
more costly than the other and with a higher social return if managed
correctly. Because more money is channelled through this project, it is
more susceptible to corruption (selection of worse materials, manipulation
of allocation mechanism such as auctions...). Agents can be of two types:
honest “moral” agents who suﬀer some utility loss due to the feeling of
guilt when engaging in corrupt activities and potentially dishonest agents
who only care about monetary payoﬀs.
In any time period, new agents are born who will become active in the
next period. New agents have no preferences but receive them via ed-
ucation. Each new agent is randomly matched to an active agent who
becomes his cultural parent. Cultural parents care about the future of
their “children” and want to maximize their children’s well-being. When
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deciding what value to transmit, parents evaluate their child’s well-being
as if it were their own.2 Following Bisin and Verdier [5] the cultural parent
chooses the “coeﬃcient of cultural transmission”, or the education eﬀort
i.e., the probability with which the parent’s cultural trait is adopted by the
child. If the child does not “learn” from the parent, he imitates either a
randomly chosen member of the parent’s generation or is educated by the
state.
We depart from the two-period lived agent assumption in Bisin and
Verdier [5] by assuming a Poisson (death and birth) process instead. Agents
have a probability of survival equal to λ each period. Since expected life in
this case is 1/(1− λ), a period in the model can be mapped into diﬀerent
real time periods by choosing the parameter λ appropriately and, therefore,
a policy measure can have an eﬀect in a short period in real time.
We show that for a certain range of parameters on the relative payoﬀs of
corruption and the technology of corruption monitoring, the economy has
two steady states in the absence of public education: a “good” equilibrium
with low corruption, little output distortion and wide-spread anticorrup-
tion ethics and a “bad” equilibrium with high corruption, high output
distortion and little anticorruption ethics. In the long run, corrupt behav-
ior and the values sustaining this behavior are determined jointly. This
joint determination generates multiple equilibria and thereby provides an
explanation why economically similar countries with the same anticorrup-
tion laws might nevertheless end up with very distinct levels of corruption.
While multiplicity is not a new result (e.g.Andvig and Moene [1], Cadot [6],
Carrillo [7], Casagrande [8,9], Lui [12], Sah [13], Tirole [14]), the existing
literature needs complicated nonlinear assumptions to generate this result
and requires some form of heterogeneity among economic agents which is
exogenous to the model. This is usually modelled as moral costs (cultural
attitudes) existing in fixed proportions. In our model cultural attitudes
evolve endogenously and no non-linearity assumption is needed. Moreover,
in our model any stable steady state is interior since both type of agents
choose positive transmission coeﬃcients.
The endogenization of moral values allows us to study both the long run
eﬀects and the dynamics of policy measures. We first show that all the
typical anticorruption policies proposed in standard economic models work
also in the present context: higher wages and higher fines make corruption
more costly and therefore reduce the proportion of pure money-maximizers
in the good and bad equilibrium. A better monitoring technology also
reduces the incentives for corrupt activities. Moreover, it is shown that
a temporary increase on spending in monitoring might have permanent
2In this context parents cannot be modeled by making them act as a social planner and
maximize their child’s future payoﬀ because this problem is not well defined: the child’s
payoﬀ is only defined after parents have made decisions on what values to transmit.
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eﬀects and lead the economy from the high corruption steady state to the
low corruption steady state. Finally, we discuss temporary public education
campaigns. We show that they successfully reduce corruption if and only
if they are intensive enough: this means that the public education eﬀort
needs to be high enough and the campaign long-lasting. If the campaign is
interrupted too early or the public education eﬀort is too low, corruption
will return to its initial level. Simulations show that we can roughly match
the dynamics of the Hong Kong experience by assuming that the expected
length of working life is about 35 years.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
introduce the model and characterize the steady states. Policy implications
are spelt out in section 3. Section 4 is dedicated to the discussion of public
education campaigns. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We propose a principal-agent model similar to Tirole’s [14]. We consider
a random matching model where each agent can never meet the same prin-
cipal twice. At each time t (−∞ < t < ∞) every active agent is matched
with a new principal. The principal gives the agent one of 2 projects:
Project 1 yields a higher payoﬀ to the principal than Project 2 if the agent
is honest, but is more conducive to corrupt behavior. The payoﬀs to the
principal are
H > h ≥ d > D
where capital letters denote the payoﬀs to the principal if project 1 is given.
H stands for honest and D for dishonest behavior by the agent.
Agents can be of two types: honest or potentially dishonest. The payoﬀs
to an honest agent are as follows:
honest type
Project 1 Project 2
honest B b
dishonest B¯ − e b¯− e
With B, B¯, b, b¯, e > 0, B > b, B¯ > b¯ and
e > B¯ −B ≥ b¯− b ≥ 0. (1)
If (1) holds, honest agents always behave honestly. Observe that an honest
agent suﬀers from being dishonest. He is endowed with a moral attitude
which favours “honest” behaviour. On the contrary, potentially dishonest
agents only care about monetary payoﬀs:
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Potentially dishonest
Project 1 Project 2
honest B b
dishonest B¯ b¯
With these payoﬀs, a potentially dishonest type acting honestly is indis-
tinguishable from an honest type. However, under (1) potentially dishonest
agents are always dishonest. Hereafter, since we assume that (1) holds, we
shall refer to potentially dishonest players as dishonest.
The model is a model of overlapping generations. A Poisson birth and
death process is assumed, keeping the population size of active agents con-
stant. With probability λ an active agent will be active next period.3 With
probability (1 − λ) an active agent in t has a child which at the moment
of birth does not have any predetermined preferences and becomes active
in t + 1. The child is randomly matched to a cultural parent who shapes
the child’s preferences via education.4 The crucial assumption is that the
cultural parent cares about his child’ welfare and tries to maximize the
latter when deciding how much eﬀort to put into his child’s education.5
Given that at the moment of education the new agent does not have any
preferences, the parent evaluates his child’s future utility through his own
eyes. In other words he uses his payoﬀ matrix as if it were his child’s, as
in Bisin and Verdier [5].6 Casual empiricism seems to suggest that parents
are prone to believe that what works fine for them should also work fine
for their children.
The education process works as follows: The parent educates his naive
child with some education eﬀort τ . With probability equal to the educa-
3This is a major diﬀerence to Bisin and Verdier’s model where each agent only lives
two periods and is only economically active for one period. In their model one period is
one generation. In our model the the life expectancy of an active agent is 1
(1−λ) . Hence,
in our model the length of one period depends on λ and will typically be shorter than
one generation.
4Notice that the mathematical structure of the model and the results would be un-
changed if we had real parents who educate their own children instead of cultural parents.
5This assumption requires some form of imperfect altruism on parts of the cultural
parents. Becker [2,3,4] has forcefully supported perfect altruism by parents.
6This behavior might seem “paternalistic”. “True altruism” would require parents to
be able to abstract from their own viewpoint. Given that the child’s preferences are
not defined before cultural transmission takes place, the only possibility to model this
true altruism is to assume that parents are able to make interpersonal comparisons of
utilities, i.e. each parent would compare the future payoﬀs for his own type from his own
viewpoint to the future payoﬀ of the other type from the viewpoint of the other type
and decide to transmit the trade which results in a higher utility. Obviously, the latter
would require the use of cardinal utilities, which is a problematic concept. Therefore, we
prefer the assumption that parents evaluate their child’s utility as if it were their own.
With this assumption two alternative model interpretations are possible: (i) parents
care about their child’s behaviour or (ii) parents care about the survival of their own
preferences.
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tion eﬀort, education will be successful and the child will be like the parent.
Otherwise, the child remains naive and gets randomly matched with some-
body else whose preferences he will adopt. Consider an honest agent who
becomes the cultural parent of a child at time t and chooses education
eﬀort τa and let pijt be the probability that a child of parent i is of type j
paat = τ
a
t + (1− τat )qt (2)
pabt = (1− τat )(1− qt) (3)
where qt is the proportion of honest agents at time t. Similarly, for the
dishonest parent we get
pbbt = τ
b
t + (1− τ bt)(1− qt) (4)
pbat = (1− τ bt)qt (5)
where τ b is the dishonest parents’ education eﬀort.
2.1. The education choice
Let C(τ) be the cost of the education eﬀort τ , and assume that C0(τ) > 0
for all τ ∈ (0, 1], C(0) = C 0(0) = 0 and C00(τ) > 0. We denote by V ij is the
utility a parent with preferences i attributes to his child having preferences
j. V ij depends on the policy expectations of the parent. In order to assess
V ij a parent of type i uses his own payoﬀ matrix. This means that each
parent attributes to his cultural child the utility the parent himself would
have gotten in the position of the child. Since honest behavior is optimal
for the honest type (B > B¯− e given project 1 and b > b¯− e given project
2) and dishonest behavior is optimal for the potentially dishonest type
(B¯ > B given project 1 and b¯ > b given project 2), V ii > V ij always.7
Given a policy expectation, a parent of type i chooses the education
eﬀort τ ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes
piit V
ii
t + p
ij
t V
ij
t − C(τ t) (6)
where pij and pii are defined above. Maximizing (6) with respect to τ we
get the following first order condition
C 0(τ i) =
dpii
dτ i
V ii +
dpij
dτ i
V ij (7)
7In section 2.2 we introduce an assumption, namely equation (12) , that guarantees
that dishonest behavior for a potentially dishonest agent is also optimal if the principal
awards project 1 to people with a clean reputation and project 2 to people that are
known to be dishonest.
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where we have suppressed the time indicators.
Substituting (2)-(5) in (7), we get the optimal education eﬀorts τa and
τ b,
C 0(τa) = (V aa−V ab)(1− q) (8)
C 0(τ b) = (V bb−V ba)q (9)
In order to have interior solutions τ ∈ (0, 1) we need that C 0(0) = 0 and
that C 0(1) > B¯/(1 − λ), which is the upper bound to agents’ payoﬀs. It
follows from (8) and (9) that the optimal eﬀort level is τ i = τ(q, V ii−V ij)
with
∂τa(q, V aa−V ab)
∂q
= − V
aa−V ab
C00(τa(q, V aa−V ab))
< 0 and
∂τ b(q, V bb−V ba)
∂q
=
V bb−V ba
C00(τ b(q, V bb−V ba))
> 0.
Since V ii − V ij depends on the parent’s policy expectations, so does the
optimal eﬀort level τ i(q, V ii − V ij).
We can now characterize the dynamic behavior of qt:
qt+1 = λqt + (1− λ)(qtpaat + (1− qt)pbat )
substituting (2) and (5), we obtain
qt+1 = qt + (1− λ)qt(1− qt)(τa(qt, V aat −V abt )− τ b(qt, V bbt −V bat ))
which can be rewritten as
qt+1 − qt = (1− λ)qt(1− qt)(τa(qt, V aat −V abt )− τ b(qt, V bbt −V bat )) (10)
Given the optimal policies of principals we are going to analyze in sections
2.2 and 2.3 it will be useful to know how (10) behaves under a stationary
policy expectation, i.e. if V aat −V abt = V aa−V ab and V bbt −V bat = V bb−V ba
for all t. In this case, (10) has three rest points: i) q = 0, ii) q = 1 and iii)
q = q∗,
q∗ =
V aa−V ab
V bb−V ba+V aa−V ab
(11)
with τa(q∗, V aa−V ab) = τ b(q∗, V bb−V ba). From (8) and (9) it is easy to see
that for given V aa−V ab and V bb−V ba vertical cultural transmission (par-
ents) and oblique cultural transmission (society) are substitutes, namely
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parents have less incentive to educate their children the more frequent is
their trait in the population. In fact with C0(0) = 0, honest (dishonest)
parents put zero eﬀort when q = 1 (q = 0). Under cultural substitution the
interior rest point is globally stable while the other rest points are unstable
(see Bisin and Verdier [5]).
2.2. The principals’ choice
Each period a principal has to decide which project to delegate to the
agent with whom he is matched. We assume that principals maximize
their expected payoﬀs and that they know the proportion of honest agents
in the population, but not the type of a particular agent. We assume that
the principal can know with positive probability α whether the agent he is
facing is dishonest.8 An honest agent will never be revealed as dishonest.
There is no information leakage across principals.9 If one principal learns
that an agent is dishonest it can still be the case that in the future the
same agent is taken for an honest one.
Let σs be the separating strategy consisting of oﬀering project 1 to seem-
ingly honest agent and project 2 to agents who are found to be dishonest.
Assuming that principals follow strategy σs, then potentially dishonest
player will behave dishonestly if
B < (1− α)B¯ + αb¯,
which can be rewritten as
α <
B¯ −B
B¯ − b¯
. (12)
Hereafter we will assume that (12) holds.
Let σp be the pooling strategy of oﬀering project 2 to everyone. Principals
prefer strategy σs to σp if
qt(H − h) + (1− qt)(1− α)(D − d) > 0, (13)
8Tirole [14] assumes that the principal has some imperfect information about each
agent’s past behaviour: with probability α he knows if the agent has been dishonest
at least once in the past. Under this information structure corrupt newborns are in-
distinguishable from honest agents. With Tirole’s story the qualitative results are the
same, but the calculations are much more cumbersome. Notice that in Tirole the gain
from being corrupt is higher in some cases, since cheating cannot be detected in the first
period of a dishonest agent’s life.
9Information leakage across principals does not aﬀect the qualitative results of the
paper.
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which can be rewritten as
qt >
(1− α)(d−D)
(H − h) + (d−D)(1− α) = q˜(α). (14)
Let π(σ, q) be the payoﬀ obtained by a principal who chooses strategy σ
when the proportion of honest agents is q, and let σ(qt) be the principals’
optimal strategy at time t
σ(qt) = arg max
σ∈{σs,σp}
π(σ, qt) (15)
By (14)
σ(qt) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
σs if qt > q˜(α)
{σs, σp} if qt = q˜(α)
σp if qt < q˜(α)
2.3. The steady states.
We now characterize the steady states of the economy. The education
eﬀort exerted by a parent in t depends on the expectation about the prin-
cipals’ policy in the future. A “policy” is an (infinite) sequence {σz}∞z=t1 ,
with σz ∈ {σs, σp}, for all z. We will denote by {σi}t2t1 , the sequence con-
sisting of the repetition of σi from t1 to t2 (t1 < t2 ≤ ∞). Let V ij(ket ) be
the expected utility a parent of type i attributes to his child born in t (and
active in t+1) having preferences j when the expected policy is ket and let
τ i(qt,ket ) = τ i(qt,V ii(ket ) − V ij(ket )) be the education eﬀort of a parent of
type i in t who expects a policy ket = {σz}∞z=t+1.
Lemma 2.1. Assume C0(τ) > 0 and that condition (12) holds. Then
1.τa(qt, {σs}∞t+1) R τ b(qt, {σs}∞t+1), when qt Q q¯
2.τa(qt, {σp}∞t+1) R τ b(qt, {σp}∞t+1), when qt Q q
3.τa(qt, {{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T }) R τ b(qt, {{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T }), when qt Q q¯ −
λT−t−1(q¯ − q),
4.τa(qt, {{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T }) R τ b(qt, {{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T }), when qt Q q +
λT−t−1(q¯ − q), where
q =
e− (b¯− b)
e
and q¯ =
e+ α(B¯ − b¯)− (B¯ −B)
e
. (16)
Proof. From (8)-(9) we get that τa(qt, ket ) > τ b(qt, ket ) when
qt <
V aa(ket )− V
ab(ket )
V bb(ket )− V
ba
(ket ) + V
aa
(ket )− V
ab
(ket )
(17)
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Computing the right hand side of (17) for the diﬀerent expected policy
profiles we get the values above. ¤
Observe that q¯ > q when
α >
(B¯ −B)− (b¯− b)
B¯ − b¯
(18)
Lemma 2.1 compares the education eﬀorts exerted by the two types of
parent for four diﬀerent policy expectations, two of them stationary (cases 1
and 2) and two of them involving a policy change at a future date T (cases
3 and 4) but are stationary from period T onwards. Under stationary
expectations, both V aa(ket )− V ab(ket ) and V bb(ket )−V ba(ket ) are constant.
Proposition 2.1. Assume C 0(τ) > 0 for all τ ∈ (0, 1), C(0) = 0, C0(0) =
0, q0 6= {0, 1}, (12), (18) hold, principals follow σ(qt) and agents have ra-
tional expectations. Then
1. qt converges to q¯ if q˜ < q,
2.qt converges to q if q˜ > q¯ and
3. when q < q˜ < q¯, there always exist (stationary) expectations such that
(i)qt converges to q¯ if q0 > q˜ and
(ii)qt converges q if q0 < q˜
where q˜ is the minimal proportion of honest agents that make the separat-
ing policy optimal for principals.
Proof. See Appendix.
We refer to q¯ and q as the low corruption and the high corruption steady
states, respectively.
We could have an indeterminacy when q < q˜ < q¯. Assume for instance
that q0 < q˜ and all agents expect that at some future period there will be
a switch in the policy with the principals following the separating strategy,
namely ket = {{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T }. Such expectations will be fulfilled if at
period T it is optimal for the principals to switch to the separating strategy,
namely when qT−1 < q˜ < qT . Notice, from Lemma 2.1, that under those
expectations, honest parents put higher education eﬀort than dishonest
parents whenever qt < q + λT−t−1(q¯ − q).10
The multiplicity of steady states results from the interplay of collective
and individual reputation and the incentives of cultural parents to educate
their children. Notice that the optimal education eﬀort of a type-i parent
depends positively on the utility gain he attributes to his child being of type
i rather than j (V ii(ket )−V ij(ket )) and negatively on the proportion of type-
10If agents had backward looking expectations, believing that the principals will follow
today’s strategy thereafter, namely ket = {σ(qt)}∞t+1 proposition 2.1 also holds and, in
case 3, qt converges always to q¯ if q0 > q˜ and to q if q0 < q˜ .
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i agents in the population (substitution eﬀect). The economic environment
the child will face in the future, in particular whether or not individual rep-
utation will be taken into account, determines parents’ expectations and
their perceived utility gain: if principals ignore individual reputation and
use the pooling policy, honest individuals suﬀer from the bad collective
reputation and the gain for being honest rather than dishonest is relatively
small, since everybody is given the bad project (Project 2). If principals
use the separating policy, honest agents will always get the good project
(Project 1) whereas dishonest agents will only get the good project with
probability 1−α. In this case the reward for being honest rather than dis-
honest is relatively large and it is larger the better the monitoring technique
(i.e. the higher α). Indeed, with a very eﬃcient monitoring technique (a
high α implies a low q˜) the only steady state is the low corruption equilib-
rium (case 1 in Proposition 2.1). For suﬃciently low proportions of honest
agents in the population (qt < q˜), honest agents educate more than dishon-
est agents despite the pooling strategy being played because of the cultural
substitution between the vertical transmission (parents) and oblique trans-
mission (society). For q˜ < qt < q the education eﬀort of honest agents is
higher than that of dishonest agents, because honest children will get the
good project for sure. For q < qt, dishonest agents educate more due to
the cultural substitution eﬀect mentioned above (there are few dishonest
agents in the population).
On the other hand, with a too ineﬃcient monitoring technique (q <
q˜) the low corruption steady state q¯ can never be reached under rational
expectations. Principals will ignore individual reputation most of the time
and when they do not (i.e. qt > q˜), the dishonest agents’ education eﬀort
is larger than the eﬀort of honest parents whose cultural child is likely to
meet the right person should their education fail (substitution eﬀect).
3. POLICY MEASURES.
Under rational expectations the steady state to which the system con-
verges is determined by the relative positions of q¯, q and q˜; in the case
where q < q˜ < q¯, the initial proportion of honest agents also plays a role.
While the position of q only depends on the payoﬀ matrices of the agents, q¯
and q˜ also depend on the accuracy of the principals’ information α. Hence,
feasible policy measures will have to aﬀect the remuneration to agents or
the accuracy of principals’ information or agents’ expectations. We shall
now discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these measures.
3.1. Improving principals’ information
A possibility for controlling corruption is to invest in monitoring. An
increase in the accuracy of principals’ information α (and thereby in the
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probability of detecting fraudulent behavior) has the eﬀect of increasing
the proportion of honest agents in the low corruption equilibrium and of
lowering q˜ (the minimum proportion of honest agents in the population
that makes optimal the separating strategy). By shifting the critical value
q˜(α) to a lower value, a higher α increases the basin of attraction of the low
corruption equilibrium. The following argument shows that a temporary
increase in spending on monitoring will be suﬃcient to escape the high
corruption steady state.
We assume that the initial (so far exogenous) α = α∗ corresponds to the
probability with which the principal can costlessly detect a dishonest type.
Let α∗ be such that
q¯(α∗)H + (1− q¯(α∗))(1− α∗)D + (1− q¯(α∗))α∗d > qh+ (1− q)d
where
q¯(α∗) =
e+ α∗(B¯ − b¯)− (B¯ −B)
e
q =
e− (b¯− b)
e
Hence principals receive a higher payoﬀ in the low corruption steady state
than in the high corruption steady state. Assume further that the accuracy
of the monitoring technology can be improved at a cost CM (α) > 0 for all
α > α∗.
Define the function α :[0,1]→ R
α(q) = 1− q
1− q
H − h
d−D
α() is decreasing in q, α(0) = 1, limq→1α(q) = −∞. Notice from (14) that
q˜(α(q)) = q for all q and that the separating strategy is optimal whenever
αt ≥ α(qt). If principals increase their accuracy of information above
α∗, choosing αt ≥ max{α∗, α(qt)} at each time t, the separating strategy
σs is optimal and seemingly honest people will get project 1. By lemma
2.1 the high corruption steady state will be destabilized if honest agents
expect the principals to follow the separating strategy for ever, namely ket =
{σs}∞t+1. Notice that the spending on monitoring can decrease as honesty
grows. However, there is a trade-oﬀ between how long the extra expenditure
takes place and how much extra is spent: The higher is αt, the faster
qt will grow since, for a given q, the gain from being honest (dishonest)
increases (decreases) with α, as do the education eﬀorts exerted by the
honest (dishonest) parents. More formally, let {α0s}∞s=t be the sequence
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which maximizes
∞X
s=t
δs−t(qsH + (1− qs)(1− αs)D + (1− qs)αsd− CM (αs))
subject to αs ≥ max{α∗, α(qs)},
where δ is the discount factor, qs evolve according to (10), and parents
correctly anticipate the principals’ policy. The principals will implement
such a policy if the gains from moving to the low corruption steady state
outweigh the costs, i.e. if
∞X
s=t
δs−t(qsH+(1− qs)(1− α0s)D+(1− qs)α
0
sd−CM (α0s)) ≥
(qh+ (1− q)d)
1− δ ,
If this equation is satisfied principals will implement the temporary invest-
ment in spending. The policy measure is perfectly credible if agents can
observe how much principals spent on monitoring, since at each time t
principals behave optimally given the accuracy of their information αt. In
practice it is easy to make spending on monitoring observable.11
As in more standard corruption models, improving the principals’ infor-
mation also leads to better outcomes in our model. Instead of investing
in monitoring, principals could change their organizational structure and
allow for information flows among principals (e.g., by computerizing their
information). This reduces the probability that past corrupt behavior goes
unnoticed and therefore reduces the expected payoﬀs to corrupt agents who
are very likely to loose project 1 forever. At the same time, since it is less
likely that the good project is given to a corrupt person, principals require
a lower proportion of honest agents in order to be willing to apply the
separating policy.
3.2. Changing the agents’ remunerations
Changing the remuneration to the agents will aﬀect equilibrium values
directly. From (2.1) it is easy to see that an increase in the payoﬀ when
agents behave honestly in project 1 (B) and in project 2 (b) increases
the equilibrium proportion of honest players in the low and in the high
corruption equilibria, respectively (∂q¯/∂B > 0 and ∂q/∂b > 0). The same
is true for a decrease of B¯ and b¯ (∂q¯/∂B¯ < 0 and ∂q/∂b¯ < 0). These
11By a similar argument, principals could incur a cost by simply choosing the good
project in a bad environment (qt < q˜) to stimulate education eﬀorts of honest parents.
In other words, principals would have to apply the separating policy σs despite its being
sub-optimal in the short run. For this policy to be eﬀective agents would have to believe
that principals are willing to ignore their cut-oﬀ value over several periods.
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results coincide with more standard corruption models where higher wages
and higher fines lead to less corruption.12 Notice, that even though the
equilibrium level of corruption changes, the high corruption equilibrium
will only be destabilized if the new remunerations to agents when awarded
project 2 increase q above q˜. In this case Proposition 2.1 part 1 applies:
the only attractor is the low corruption steady state q¯.
3.3. Coordinating agents’ expectations
All policy measures discussed so far have aﬀected the organizational and
economic setup. This in turn aﬀected agents’ expectations and thereby led
to a change in the distribution of moral values. We now consider an alter-
native policy measure that aﬀects agents’ expectations directly: Principals
announce a time consistent policy change in the future. This measure ex-
ploits the indeterminacy mentioned in section 2.3 and nicely illustrates the
driving dynamics in our model.13
Assume that the economy is in the high corruption steady state; everyone
is getting project 2. In the high corruption steady state no principal has
an incentive to give project 1 to anyone. Assume now, that at t principals
commit to the policy profile {{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T }; namely, they will oﬀer
project 2 to everyone (pooling strategy) until time T − 1, and from T
onwards project 1 will be oﬀered, but only to seemingly honest agents
(separating strategy). This policy will be credible if qT−1 ≤ q˜ ≤ qT
The policy announcement raises the value of being honest more than
it increases the value of being dishonest, hence the proportion of honest
agents grows. The announcement is time consistent, since the proportion
of honest players in the population is such that, at the moment of the
change, (14) is satisfied and {σs}∞t is the optimal policy sequence from
then onwards. Observe that by proposition 2.1, the system converges to
the low corruption steady state. Notice that the policy announcement
works as a way of coordinating agents’ expectations.
Figure 1 shows an illustration of the working of the policy announcement.
The economy is initially in the high corruption equilibrium. The con-
tinuous line is the value of q˜. The announcement of the policy change in
T = 15 increases the honest parents’ eﬀort today and q starts growing. Be-
tween the moment of the announcement and t = 14, the principals follow
the pooling strategy (white squares). At T = 15 the economy is, for the
first time, in the region where the separating strategy is optimal since q˜
12In this paper we did not explicitly model fines for corrupt activities. However, we
can interpret B¯ and b¯ as expected payoﬀs from corrupt activities, taking into account
the possibility to be fined. With this interpretation, B¯ and b¯ decrease if fines increase.
13We do not consider this measure as particularly policy relevant since it involves a
coordination problem among principals. In order for this scenario to apply principals
would have to move as one Stackelberg leader.
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Public education aﬀects the probabilities of honest and dishonest children
as follows14:
paat = τ
a
t + (1− τat )(qt(1− ρ) + ρ)
pabt = (1− τat )(1− qt)(1− ρ)
pbbt = τ
b
t + (1− τ bt)(1− qt)(1− ρ)
pbat = (1− τ bt)(qt(1− ρ) + ρ)
The first order conditions that determine the private education eﬀorts are
now:
C 0(τa) = [V aa−V ab](1− q)(1− ρ) (19)
C 0(τ b) = [V bb−V ba](q(1− ρ) + ρ) (20)
The new population dynamics are given by the following diﬀerence equation
for qt:
∆q = (1− λ)(1− q)q(1− ρ)(τa(q, V aa−V ab, ρ)− τ b(q, V bb−V ba, ρ)) +
(1− λ)(1− q)ρ(1− τ b(q, V bb−V ba, ρ)) (20)
This diﬀerence equation shows that (i) q = 1 is always a rest point of the
system, (ii) q = 0 is only a rest point if there is no public education (ρ = 0),
(iii) if an interior solution exists, the education eﬀort of dishonest parents
is higher than of honest parents (τa < τ b). The introduction of public
education has two opposite eﬀects: while its direct eﬀect is to increase the
proportion of honest agents, its indirect eﬀect is to change the incentives for
private education. Honest parents educate less because public education
increases the chances of their children getting the right preferences anyway,
while dishonest parents educate more. Notice, that if ρ = 1 the system
converges to q = 1 although honest parents do not educate their children
at all. Hence, for ρ = 1, ∆q > 0 for all q < 1. By continuity, there exists
a ρ¯ such that for ρ > ρ¯ ∆q > 0 for all q < 1. Indeed, it is easy to see that
for ρ > τ b(1,maxV bb − V ba, ρ) q = 1 is the only attractor.15
The above analysis establishes the success of a temporary intensive ed-
ucation campaign with a high enough ρ. Suppose society is in the high
corruption steady state and q˜ < q¯. The government launches an intensive
education campaign with ρ > τ b(q˜,maxV bb−V ba, ρ). The campaign aﬀects
14ρ = 0 is identical to the case without public education
15This is not the cut-oﬀ value. A complete analysis of the model becomes very messy
and is beyond the scope of the paper. We are only interested in finding some temporary
education campaign which is successful.
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the population dynamics and the proportion of honest agents increases.
The education campaign can be stopped once qt > q˜; by Proposition 2.1
the system converges to the low corruption steady state q¯ if agents expect
that the separating strategy will be used from then on.
As in the case of a temporary increase in spending on monitoring, there
is a trade-oﬀ between how long the education campaign has to be imple-
mented and how much money per period is spent on public moral educa-
tion. The higher the expenditure on public education in period t (i.e. the
higher ρt), the faster qt will grow for a given q. Let the sequence {ρ0s}∞s=t+1
maximize
∞X
s=t
δs−t(π(σ(qs), qs)− CE(ρs))
s.t ∆qs = (1− λ)(1− qs)qs(1− ρs)(τa(qs, V aa−V ab, ρs)− τ b(qs, V bb−V ba, ρs)) +
(1− λ)(1− qs)ρs(1− τ b(qs, V bb−V ba, ρs))
Principals will choose the public education levels {ρ0s}∞s=t+1 if
∞X
s=t
δs−t(π(σ(qs), qs)− CE(ρ0s)) ≥
(qh+ (1− q)d)
1− δ .
Education campaigns work only if the investment in public education
is high enough during the period of the campaign and the campaign lasts
long enough. Both conditions seem to have been satisfied in the case of
Hong Kong. The education eﬀort of the Independent Commission against
Corruption (ICAC) had been very high and the project lasted a substantial
period of time (12 years). The following simulations show that our model
can roughly match the timing of this experience.
Let us consider an average working life of, say, 35 years. The choice for
the value of the parameter λ delivers an interpretation of a period in the
model as a period in real time. Since average working life is 11−λ (when the
probability of dying is 1− λ), if a period in the model is to be interpreted
as one (or twelve) year(s), we should choose λ = 0.97 (or λ = 23).
To choose a value for λ, we can consider the following two interpretations
on how education works. One is, literally, that what matters for agents’
education is the whole time they spent in school. In this case, since our
agents are educated in one period, we should interpret a period in the
model as 12 years (one fourth of the whole life span) and choose λ = 23 .
A second interpretation is that of “cultural parents” (used in this paper)
where children get randomly match to an adult who influences their edu-
cation. Under this interpretation what matters for the attitudes towards
corruption is the last year before the economically active life and we could
then interpret one period in the model as one year and take λ = 0.97.
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Scenario 11 Scenario 22
t Column 23 Column 34 Column 45 Column 56 Column 67
1 0.03 0.807 0.315 0.816 0.315
2 0.059 0.811 0.330 0.873 0.334
3 0.087 0.816 0.345 0.901 0.352
- - - - - -
12 0.306 0.854 0.470 0.952 0.500
13 0.327 0.859 0.483 0.953 0.515
14 0.347 0.863 0.496
15 0.367 0.867 0.508
1Everybody can have (cultural) children.2Only the young can have (cultural) children
3Agents born under the campaign who are alive. 4 Proportion of honest agents who
are born under the campaign and are alive under scenario 1. 5Honest agents at time
t (under scenario 1)6 Proportion of honest agents who are born under the campaign
and are alive under scenario 2. 7Honest agents at time t (under scenario 2)
the 0.03% of the workforce is renewed!) under scenario 1 and after 11 years
under scenario 2 (when only the young educate). By that time the propor-
tion of honest agents is high enough to guarantee convergence to the low
corruption steady state without any further need for interventions. When
we consider λ = 2/3, only one period of education (12 years) is needed in
both cases.
Convergence could be speeded up by combing diﬀerent policy tools. This
was indeed done in Hong Kong; at least in early years, ICAC combined
two policy measures discussed in our model: re-education and a change in
remunerations to agents to reduce the profitability of corruption. In words
of one commissioner of the ICAC: “With the adult population, we often use
the deterrent approach, that is to say, we exploit their fear of punishment.
However, in the long term, children and young people must be brought up
with the proper attitudes toward corruption.”16
Under a temporary increase on spending in monitoring principals will
always apply the separating strategy; on the contrary, under a public ed-
ucation campaign principals will ignore individual reputation for some pe-
riod, using the pooling strategy. Therefore, the payoﬀs from being honest
increase less rapidly under public education. Hence, honest agents educate
less if public education exists than if monitoring is increased. On the other
hand, public education guarantees a certain proportion of honest types.
Consequently, it is not clear under which policy measure the proportion
16Williams, “Concept of an Independent Organization to tackle Corruption,” p. 29.
Paper presented at the International Conference on Corruption and Economic Crime
against Government, Washington, D.C., October 1983.
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of honest people increases more rapidly. Which policy measure is socially
optimal is very sensitive to the actual specification of monitoring and edu-
cation costs. These costs are country-specific and hence an empirical issue
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
5. CONCLUSION
There is evidence that corruption is at least partly due to cultural ele-
ments. Public opinion does not universally consider corruption - at least
small-scale corruption - to be very negative. Sentences like “I was corrupt
but so was everybody else” reveal that a generally corrupt environment can
serve as a justification for one’s own corrupt behavior.
The present paper combines two distinct types of economic models (Ti-
role [14], Bisin and Verdier [5]) to capture some cultural aspects of cor-
ruption and to develop new policy tools. In our model remunerations were
chosen such that an agent is either always honest or always corrupt. Ana-
lyzing this extreme case allows us to single out the purely educational ef-
fects on corruption levels. In order to do so, it was assumed that newborn
agents had to form their preferences and were influenced by the education
eﬀort exerted by their parent, as well as by the general corruption level
of society. The resulting dynamics had the realistic feature that the lower
the proportion of a given type the higher its education eﬀort. This feature
keeps the steady state oﬀ the boundary and avoids a complete elimination
of corrupt (or honest) agents. Unlike in Tirole [14] the interiority of the
steady states is a result and not an assumption of the model.
Taking the model seriously implies that corruption will never be elimi-
nated completely, a view which is also expressed by Klitgaard [11]. Indeed,
there is no country without corruption, although corruption levels vary
widely across countries even with similar economic characteristics. The
present model found two steady states with diﬀerent levels of corruption
in an otherwise identical economy. This shows the strength of cultural
elements in determining the actual corruption levels of a society.
While our steady states are similar to Tirole’s [14], the underlying dy-
namics and therefore also policy implications are very diﬀerent. In Tirole
[14] there is an important asymmetry between the 2 steady states: It is
much easier to leave the low corruption steady state than the high cor-
ruption steady state. This asymmetry is a direct consequence of Tirole’s
assumption on principals’ information structure, which is such that an op-
portunistic agent (who in his model is the only agent reacting to economic
incentives) will always be corrupt once corrupted.17 In his policy analysis
17Although we do not use this information structure, its use in our model would not
produce this asymmetry between the 2 steady states.
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Tirole [14] focuses on a one-period shock to corruption, in which all oppor-
tunists behave dishonestly. In this case the only eﬀective policy measure18
is an amnesty, where principals commit to overlook past corrupt activities
(individual reputation). This allows opportunistic agents who have been
corrupt in the past to switch to honest behavior. In Tirole’s [14] model an
amnesty only works outside steady states. In our model an amnesty never
works. Instead, principals can leave the high corruption steady state by
announcing a time consistent future policy change which does not require
them to ignore the information they have about individuals. The better
world promised for their children changes parents’ education eﬀort, which
induces an increase in the proportion of moral agents, which makes the
announced policy change optimal. Additionally, we show that the high
corruption steady state can be destabilized by a temporary increase in
spending on monitoring. This policy measure also works by changing the
economic prospective of children and thereby the education eﬀort of par-
ents. Finally, we outline the conditions under which a public education
campaign can successfully reduce corruption, a policy that is widely used
but never has been evaluated in an economic model before. We find that
public education campaigns have to be intensive enough in order to suc-
cessfully reduce the level of corruption.
Controlling corruption imposes a cost on society, since individual be-
havior must be monitored. If monitoring is common and the technique is
reliable, corruption is deterred. This is also true for high fines. Both the
present model and more standard models in the corruption literature share
this desirable feature. The advantage of the present approach is that it
entails additional policy implications that can be cost-saving in the long
run. High fines work only as long as they are implemented. If, however,
young generations are educated to adopt a moral attitude against corrup-
tion, high fines or monitoring can be reduced while low corruption levels
are preserved. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption
successfully.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
Case 1: q˜ < q
1.a) Consider the expected policy profile {σs}∞t+1.
By lemma 2.1, τa(qt, {σs}∞t+1) R τ b(qt, {σs}∞t+1) for all qt Q q¯.
18Tirole [14] also talks about the possibility of prolonged anticorruption campaigns
defined as periods in which the probability of being caught and the resulting penalties
are high enough so that being corrupt is a dominated strategy of opportunists. However,
this policy measure requires a change in the information structure of principals: it is not
consistent with the assumption that a corrupt opportunist will always be corrupt.
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V aat ({σs}∞t+1)− V abt ({σs}∞t+1) = eq¯1− λ > 0 (22)
V bbt ({σs}∞t+1)− V bat ({σs}∞t+1) = e(1− q¯)1− λ > 0 (23)
Given {σs}∞t+1, q¯ is globally stable. For all q > q˜, σ(q) = σs and σ(qt+1)t≥0 =
{σs}∞t+1 if qt > q˜.
1.b) Consider the expected policy profile {σp}∞t+1.
By lemma 2.1, τa(qt, {σp}∞t+1) R τ b(qt, {σp}∞t+1) for all qt Q q.
V aa({σp}∞t+1})− V ab({σp}∞t+1}) =
eq
1− λ > 0 (24)
V bb({σp}∞t+1})− V ba({σp}∞t+1}) =
e(1− q)
1− λ > 0 (25)
Given {σp}∞t+1, q is globally stable. We can find a t > 0 such that qt is arbitrarily
close to q.
1.c) Assume now that qt < q˜ < q and consider the expected policy profile
{{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T }
V aat ({{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T })− V abt ({{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T }) = (25)
e((1− λT−t−1)q + λT−t−1q¯)
1− λ > 0, (26)
V bbt ({{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T })− V bat ({{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T }) = (27)
e((1− λT−t−1)(1− q) + λT−t−1(1− q¯))
1− λ > 0, (28)
Observe that (27) is decreasing and (29) is increasing in T. This implies that
τa(qt, {{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T })− τ b(qt, {{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T })
is decreasing in T for all q. For the same initial condition q0 < q, qt is larger the
smaller is T for all t > 0 and qT is larger the larger is T. Notice that
τa(qt, {{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T })− τb(qt, {{σp}T−1t+1 , {σs}∞T }) > τa(qt, {σp}∞t+1) >
τ b(qt, {σp}∞t+1)
for all T. There exist a finite Tˆ such qTˆ−1 ≤ q˜, and F (qTˆ−1) ≥ q˜, since under
{σp}∞t+1, q˜ is reached in finite time.
From 1.a) and 1.c) we conclude that {{σp}Tˆ−1t+1 , {σs}∞Tˆ } = σ(qt+1)t≥0, and qt
converges to q¯.
Case 2: q˜ > q¯
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2.a) If qt < q˜, {σp}∞t+1 = σ(qt+1)t≥0 and qt converges to q. (see part b) above).
2.b) qt > q˜. Consider the policy {{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T },
V aat ({{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T })− V abt ({{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T }) = (29)
e((1− λT−t−1)q¯ + λT−t−1q)
1− λ > 0, (30)
V bbt (({{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T }))− V bat (({{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T })) = (31)
e((1− λT−t−1)(1− q¯) + λT−t−1(1− q))
1− λ > 0, (32)
(31) is increasing and (33) is decreasing in T. This implies that
τa(qt, {{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T })− τ b(qt, {{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T })
is increasing in T for all q. For the same initial condition qt > q¯, qt is smaller the
smaller is T for all t > 0 and qT is smaller the larger is T. Notice that
τa(qt, {{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T })−τ b(qt, {{σs}T−1t+1 , {σp}∞T }) < τa(qt, {σs}∞t+1)−τ b(qt, {σs}∞t+1)
for all T. There exist a finite Tˆ such qTˆ−1 ≥ q˜, and F (qTˆ−1) ≤ q˜, since under
{σs}∞t+1, q˜ is reached in finite time.
From 2.a) and 2.b) we conclude that {{σs}Tˆ−1t+1 , {σp}∞Tˆ } = σ(qt+1)t≥0, and qt
converges to q.
Case 3: q < q˜ < q¯.
3.a) When qt < q˜, {σp}∞t+1 = σ(qt+1)t≥0 and qt converges to q.
3.b) When qt > q˜, {σs}∞t+1 = σ(qt+1)t≥0 and qt converges to q¯.
¤
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